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ABSTRACT 
 
Nietzsche on Truth in the Contexts of Nihilism and Health. (December 2007) 
Ali Elamin, B.A., University of Michigan – Dearborn 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Theodore D. George 
 
 In this project, I develop Nietzsche’s account of truth based on the two 
perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments 
from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. 
Nietzsche’s discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion 
of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest 
type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of 
the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche 
never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of 
human’s ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-
in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the 
concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding 
existence. 
As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking 
insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in 
cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a 
complete self, with varied drives and impulses. 
  iv 
Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the 
tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which 
depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming 
this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating 
nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his 
physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of 
living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the 
pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life. 
  v 
DEDICATION 
 
To those who are lost and find themselves, only to lose themselves again. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Nietzsche’s position on truth is one of the most important clues to decoding the 
rest of his philosophy. To understand exactly how radical his departure is from 
traditional metaphysics, we must first analyze his different comments on truth and see 
whether they amount to a coherent whole. The central question I wish to address in the 
second chapter of this thesis is whether Nietzsche’s writings allow for a unified account 
of truth or whether, on the contrary, we would be forced to divide his writings into early 
and late periods, or even see them as contradictory, as some have claimed.1
Without a clear grasp of this aspect of his philosophy, we would not be in a clear 
enough position to understand Nietzsche’s intentions in much of the other main topics he 
discusses. For example, without an adequate understanding of Nietzsche’s position on 
truth, it is hard to understand exactly what he thinks his genealogical method arrives at, 
or what his view of metaphysics is, and the scope of nihilism; and even the very nature 
of nihilism as Nietzsche saw it will elude us because to understand that, it is essential to 
understand Nietzsche’s critique of the will to truth and to figure out how much of truth-
seeking Nietzsche believes is motivated by will to truth, if not all. 
After reviewing the different writings which have been used to make the case for 
a lack of continuity in Nietzsche’s account, I argue for the reading that Nietzsche 
                                                 
This thesis follows the Chicago Manual of Style. 
 
1 Clark, Maudemarie. Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 
92. 
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presents one unified account of the concept of truth throughout his career. His argument 
is that some kind of thing-in-itself exists which is not really thing nor itself, since he 
rejects thinghood and self-identity apart from a constituting agent to introduce them into 
the world.  
His ultimate conclusion is that we can say about the world that it is the product of 
centers of force acting upon each other. This conclusion may be cast as metaphysical; 
since Nietzsche presents an explanation of the apparent world with a world that is veiled 
from our immediate attention. The difference, however, is that Nietzsche’s account does 
not cater to the demands of the will to truth that the world be constant, stable, eternal, 
replete with rigid unities. Nietzsche’s metaphysics is that of the world we live in, of 
change, becoming, of changing unities, and so on.  
His struggle, then, is not with a metaphysics that posits the existence of truth, but 
against the type of human being that is hailed as the highest type in modern culture, 
while it is no more than the purest manifestation of the will to nothingness as of yet. 
Nietzsche believes that his cultural dissections of the world reveal a gradual 
disenchantment with life, and that beings have a will to nothingness which influences 
them unconsciously into behaving in certain ways, and believing certain things. This will 
to nothingness is what makes human beings weary of life, expect too much of it, reject it, 
and create imaginary, ideal worlds to depreciate it. He concludes that most religions, 
philosophies, and belief systems are no more than beliefs in other worlds for the purpose 
of depreciating this world and strengthening this will to nothingness. “The ideal world 
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has hitherto been the actual force for disparaging the world and man, the poisonous 
vapor over reality, the great seduction to nothingness.”2
History, so far, has been the process of the will to nothingness overtaking 
mankind through time. This is manifested in the Christian dominance over most of the 
world, and then when it saw it was strong enough to grow without the help of God, it 
manifested itself in science which overthrew God, and claimed, falsely, to be the savior 
from the ascetic ideal which was the highest ideal in the realm of Christianity. But 
Nietzsche believes science to be a purer and more powerful manifestation of the will to 
truth, and therefore certainly not an antidote for it, as its champions amongst the thinkers 
of the Enlightenment promised it to be. 
So far, the analysis lacks a clear direction. If Nietzsche believes history to be the 
process of the will to nothingness overtaking humanity under several veils, and if the will 
to truth which the modern age sets up as the highest type of society after having 
overthrown the self-mutilating priest, is also nothing more than a tool of the will to 
nothingness, what does Nietzsche propose we do in order to counter the will to 
nothingness? What would be a good antidote? Ultimately, the question boils down to 
what every philosophy is supposed to be an answer for: how ought we to live our lives? 
In Chapter II, I attempt to give an answer to this very hard question. In its general 
framework, the question is very easy to answer: Nietzsche wants to effect a shift in truth-
seeking from seeking the truth about the real, the true, and so on, to an investigation of 
the truth about the cultural conditions that produce healthy, interesting, creative, serious, 
                                                 
2 Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power. Ed. Walter Kaufman, trs. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. 
Hollingdale. (New York: Vintage, 1968), p. 210, aphorism 390. 
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cheerful human beings who can create their own destiny—sovereign individuals. He 
wants a change in cultural conditions so that the highest type of human being would shift 
from the serious scientist who uses truth as an escape from life, into the more complete 
human being who uses truth for the enhancement of life. 
What is hard to determine is what exactly this amounts to. What method is there 
for us to distinguish the tools of the will to nothingness and the depreciation of life from 
the tools for the enhancement of life? What exactly is a more diversified, complete, 
sovereign human being? 
Nietzsche believes that the world is too replete with uncertainty to afford us 
straight answers to these questions. But he believes that his genealogical method is one 
of the tools we can use to determine whether what we are doing is an escape from life, a 
reaction and judgment against it, or whether we do it out of a will to health and the 
enhancement of life. The conclusion will not be definitive but the very asking for a 
straight and definite path toward what enhances life is a rejection of the uncertainty 
which is at the heart of living, and thus is a manifestation of the will to nothingness in us. 
What Nietzsche provides are only general clues based, ultimately, on his view of what 
life really is like.  
Life, for Nietzsche, is uncertain, false, unknown, deceptive, becoming, changing, 
contradictory, affective, involves an order of rank, and immoral. Any kind of action or 
belief that betrays a wish for a world that is devoid of one of these essential 
characteristics of life is probably a manifestation of the will to nothingness, and a 
rejection of life. In order to combat this will, we have to accept life as it is. We have to 
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accept contradictions, accept that not everyone is equal; and live our life without 
allowing the tyranny of any one drive or will over all the others.  
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CHAPTER II 
 TRUTH: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND THE EXTENT OF THE NIHILISM 
CRITIQUE 
 
In this chapter, I will explain how Nietzsche’s comments on truth are unified into 
one position. Then, I will use my account to point out where two interpretations go awry; 
on one extreme, interpretations claiming that Nietzsche completely rejects the usefulness 
of truth, and, on the other, those that say he sought truth for its own sake. Sarah 
Kofmann’s discussion of Nietzsche’s substituting metaphor for concept in her article 
Metaphor, Symbol and Metamorphosis,3 is taken as a prime example of the position of 
Nietzsche’s complete rejection of the usefulness of truth, and so is Richard Rorty’s 
position who believes that Nietzsche wants us to cease believing that truth has anything 
to offer us. On the other hand, Richard Schacht will be taken as a prime example of the 
interpretation that Nietzsche embraces and seeks truth for its own sake. 
Nietzsche’s Discussion of the Concept of Truth 
Nietzsche uses the word truth in his discussion in two senses. First, there is the 
sense of truth for truth’s sake, and there are several discussions, especially in his early 
notebooks, where he criticizes this concept rather harshly. However, his comments can 
be interpreted as a concentrated attack on a certain account of truth, and not on the 
concept itself. The second use of the word concerns Nietzsche’s truth in the sense of 
something useful, practical, for the purposes of advancing life. In this sense, Nietzsche 
                                                 
3 Kofman, Sarah. “Metaphor, Symbol, Metamorphosis.” The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of 
Interpretation. (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1977), 201. 
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embraces the concept and says for example that “truth is the kind of error without which 
a certain species of life could not live.”4 The use of truth and truth-seeking is only 
beneficial when it “legitimize(s) itself before another tribunal: -- as a means of the 
preservation of man, as will to power.”5 So the pursuit of truth for Nietzsche is not 
inimical to life when it is subdued and controlled. Let us now turn to Nietzsche’s 
comments on the concept of truth. 
 We are told by Maudemarie Clark in her book Nietzsche on Truth and 
Philosophy, that Nietzsche did not prove the non-existence of truth in his early writings 
in “Truth and Lies in the Extra-moral Sense,” but rather that he had two confused, 
incompatible views on the denial of the concept. The first “is the Kantian version 
Nietzsche adopts throughout most of the essay. Transcendent truth is both conceivable 
and of overriding value, but unattainable for human beings. The second is neo-Kantian 
or Nietzschean. Transcendent truth is inconceivable, a contradiction in terms.”6 Of 
course, Nietzsche did not prove the non-existence of truth. To think that he has done so 
is to misconstrue his remark in the following quote as referring to the concept of 
transcendent truth itself, without reference to a knower: “‘the adequate expression of an 
object in the subject’—is a contradictory impossibility.”7
                                                 
4 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 272, aphorism 493. 
 
5 Ibid., p. 272, aphorism 495. 
 
6 Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, 92. 
 
7 Nietzsche, Friedrich. “On Truth and Lies in A Nonmoral Sense.” Philosophy and Truth: Selections from 
Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s. Ed. and Tr. Daniel Breazeale. (New York: Humanity Books, 
1999), p. 86, aphorism 1. 
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Nietzsche specifically says: “Are these designations congruent with things? Is 
language the adequate expression of all realities? … It is only by means of forgetfulness 
that man can ever reach the point of fancying himself to possess a ‘truth’ of the grade 
just indicated.”8 Thus, Nietzsche is clearly assailing the correspondence theory of truth, 
or what Clark calls transcendent truth. However, he is also attacking a grade of that kind 
of truth that is certain. In other words, his critique is of the claim that we can be certain 
of the fact that any belief of ours corresponds with the reality of the world as it is. He 
bases this on the fact that our contact with reality is based on perception, and even 
assuming that the cause of the nerve stimuli which constitute perception is outside of us 
(whatever that might be) is “false and unjustif(ied).” Nature remains concerned “only 
with an X which remains inaccessible and undefinable for us,”9 for otherwise, we would 
have to judge our perception according to a “criterion of the correct perception, which 
means, in accordance with a criterion which is not available.” Nietzsche continues to say 
that “in any case, it seems… that the ‘correct perception’—which would mean ‘the 
adequate expression of an object in the subject’—is a contradictory impossibility.”10 He 
explains that he thinks this because of the fact that there is no way to bridge the gap 
between subject and object except aesthetically, which means the physiological process 
of transforming the nerve stimulus into an image, and then that image into a sound.11 
Consciousness’ contact is only with perception, i.e., with the data that result from this 
                                                 
8 Ibid., p. 81, aphorism 1. 
 
9 Ibid., p. 83, aphorism 1. 
 
10 Ibid., p. 86, aphorism 1. 
 
11 Ibid., p. 82, aphorism 1. 
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aesthetic process of turning nerve stimuli into images, therefore, it is a contradictory 
impossibility for us to consciously get at the true nature of the world. In other words, the 
very fact of “getting at” in the act of “getting at the world,” involves an aesthetic relation 
which anthropomorphizes (and thus potentially falsifies) the world, and thus since we 
can never tell when this anthropomorphizing effect falsifies reality and when it does not, 
we can never be certain about reality and thing in itself.  
Granted, there is no literal contradiction here of the grade of “X is and is not at 
the same time, in the same sense, etc…,” however, this interpretation of the quote which 
assumes a loose use of language on Nietzsche’s part is justified by what Nietzsche 
follows the quote with. He says right after ‘contradictory impossibility’: “For between 
two absolutely different spheres, as between subject and object, there is no causality, no 
correctness, and no expression; there is, at most, an aesthetic relation.”12 Thus, the focus 
is on the nature of the subject and the nature of the object and how adequate knowledge 
by the former of the latter is not possible. But what does not possible here mean? It 
means no more than Nietzsche’s initial position when he rejected the possibility of 
certainty with respect to any correspondence account of truth. He is saying that certain 
knowledge of the source of our nerve stimuli based on perception is impossible due to 
the nature of perception itself. Furthermore, since perception is our only venue of contact 
with said source, certain knowledge of things in themselves is impossible for us. In other 
words, he is not rejecting the possibility of accidental correspondence “that would of 
course be a dogmatic assertion and, as such, would be just as indemonstrable as its 
                                                 
12 Ibid., p. 86, aphorism 1. 
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opposite,”13 but that it is not possible for us to know whether our knowledge ever does 
correspond or not. 
 So, contrary to Clark’s claim, Nietzsche’s critique of the concept of transcendent 
truth is complementary and unified in “Truth and Lies in the Extra-Moral Sense,” and it 
targets certainty and correspondence theories of truth. Breazeale suggests that 
Nietzsche’s critique in the early notebooks is unified and coherent, but worries that 
Nietzsche “may later have become (critical) of this distinction between ‘reality’ and 
‘appearance’,”14 also pointing out that his concern springs from a section of Twilight of 
the Idols titled: “How the ‘Real World’ at last Became a Myth.” 
 In that section, Nietzsche says that he is tracing the “history of an error.”15 He 
traces the idea of a “real world” from Plato, to Christianity, to Kant, and finally to 
himself, where he reasons: “unattainable? Unattained, at any rate. And if unattained also 
unknown. Consequently also no consolation, no redemption, no duty: How could we 
have a duty toward something unknown?... the ‘real world’ – an idea no longer of any 
use, not even a duty any longer – an idea grown useless, superfluous, consequently a 
refuted idea: let us abolish it!”16 If we pay close attention to the reasoning here, which is 
highlighted and emphasized by Nietzsche’s own italics, it becomes evident that we are 
no longer speaking about the same kind of truth that Nietzsche was discussing earlier. In 
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 84, aphorism 1. 
 
14 Breazeale, Daniel. “Introduction.” Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the 
Early 1870’s. Ed. and Tr. Daniel Breazeale. (New York: Humanity Books, 1999), p. xxvii, footnote 21. 
 
15 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, Trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 50. 
 
16 Ibid.. 
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the earlier discussion, the concept of truth was being discussed as truth in itself, i.e., as 
truth that is determined only by the standards of what is true. Thus, since we are talking 
about truth for truth’s sake, Nietzsche admitted that the thing in itself exists and is 
unknowable. However, the logic here is beyond the logic of truth for truth’s sake. The 
truth-seeking that is exhibited in Nietzsche’s reasoning smells of Nietzsche’s new logic 
of controlled truth, based on reflection about usefulness for life and health. The 
indictment against the real world is not that it is false (Nietzsche’s designation of the real 
world as an error merely refers to his idea that any human conjecture about truth in itself 
is necessarily unverifiable and thus false in the strict sense of uncertain), but that it is no 
longer useful; it has become superfluous, and consequently it is a refuted idea.  
 So, Nietzsche does not reject the Kantian account of truth even in his late 
writings, he merely sets it aside by introducing a new logic, which is supposed to be 
buttressed by new impulses and drives, which is the mark of how his new philosophers 
will deal with truth: “what is great has a right to history, but not a history of the iconic 
sort; rather, it merits a productive and stimulating canvas of historical events. We leave 
the graves undisturbed: we take possession of what is eternally alive.”17 For history, 
here, truth, in general can be substituted by the new logic of truth-conducive-to-health, 
the understanding of which requires a look at Nietzsche’s critique of what he calls “will 
to truth.” 
 
                                                 
17 Nietzsche, Friedrich. “The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle Between Art and Knowledge.” 
Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s. Ed. and Tr. Daniel 
Breazeale. (New York: Humanity Books, 1999), p. 13, aphorism 41. 
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The ‘Will to truth’ vs. ‘Use of Truth’ 
It is possible to gain much insight into Nietzsche’s approach to truth by turning 
to his discussion of what he calls creditor-debtor relationship in the Genealogy of 
Morals. The debtor-creditor relationship is the contractual relationship between human 
beings of past times, where if a person (a debtor) wanted to borrow something from 
another person (a creditor), he would have to pledge something in case of failure to keep 
the promise of returning what was borrowed. This relationship, Nietzsche argues, 
through its instruments of punishment, injury, and cruelty, creates a bad conscience in 
the noble types. The noble type is the one that “experiences itself as determining values; 
does not need approval; it judges, ‘what is harmful to me is harmful in itself;’ it knows 
itself to be that which first accords honor to things; it is value-creating.”18
When a debtor failed to keep his promise to a creditor, the creditor used to collect 
what was due to him in the currency of sadism -- causing the debtor physical pain, and 
satisfying one’s sadistic feelings. Through “a great deal of severity, cruelty, and pain,”19 
memory developed and was enhanced. To inspire trust, the debtor needed to substitute 
something he possessed as payment in case of failure of payment: wife, freedom, life, or 
afterlife, but mainly the body.20 Because the price of forgetting was so high, this was the 
start of the creation of memory, prudence, caution, self-criticism, “‘Injury makes one 
prudent,’ says the proverb: insofar as it makes one prudent it also makes one bad. 
                                                 
18 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil, Trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London:  Penguin Books, 1990), 
Section 260. 
 
19 Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morals. Tr. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1989), 64. 
 
20 Ibid.. 
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Fortunately, it frequently makes people stupid.”21 Legal systems developed from the 
necessity to determine how much pain and suffering was equal to what kind of broken 
promise. The debtor-creditor relationship and its dynamic create a whole moral 
conceptual world built out of “guilt,” “conscience,” “duty,” “sacredness of duty,” all of 
which, Nietzsche argues, have their origin in the sphere of legal obligations.22 How was 
this moral conceptual world created? 
As political organization developed, and humans were forced into societies, with 
rules and laws, the “instinct for freedom (was) forcibly made latent… pushed back and 
repressed, incarcerated with and finally able to discharge and vent itself only on itself: 
that, and that alone, is what the bad conscience is in its beginnings.”23 As animals we 
have a tendency to hurt, and when this tendency’s natural expression outward is blocked, 
we inflict the hurt on ourselves. Thus, our sadism becomes masochism – and since for 
Nietzsche the unity of self is a mere effect of the struggle of different drives and 
impulses24: sado-masochism.25
As this instinct to self-torture was spiritualized and enhanced, all sorts of ascetic 
practices were developed as ways to reject and torture the body and everything that is of 
this world in the self. “the earth (is) the distinctively ascetic planet, a nook of 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 83. 
 
22 Ibid., 65. 
 
23 Ibid., 87. 
 
24 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Nietzsche: Writings From the Late Notebooks. Ed. Rudiger Bittner, Tr. Kate 
Sturge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), section: “Notebook 10, Autumn 1887,” note 19, 
page 178. See also notebook 40, notes 21 and 42. 
 
25 Nietzsche, Genealogy, 92. 
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disgruntled, arrogant, and offensive creatures filled with a profound disgust at 
themselves, at the earth, at all life, who inflict as much pain on themselves as they 
possibly can out of pleasure in inflicting pain – which is probably their only pleasure.” 
The ascetic ideal “springs from the protective instinct of a degenerating life which tries 
by all means to sustain itself and to fight for its existence… life struggles with it and 
through it with death and against death; the ascetic ideal is an artifice for the 
preservation of life… more precisely against disgust with life, against exhaustion, 
against the desire for the ‘end.’”26 So the ascetic ideal is the instinct to life in weak and 
sickly humans. Their inability to affirm life prompts them to weary of it and reject it. 
However, in their weariness, in their rejection, they find their “restless energy,” they find 
their yes for life. “Even when he wounds himself, this master of destruction, of self-
destruction—the very wound itself afterward compels him to live.”27 Thus Nietzsche 
asks in the Will to Power, “Is an increase in virtuousness compatible with an increase in 
cleverness and insight? Dubito; only too often I shall have occasion to show the reverse. 
Has virtuousness as a goal not hitherto been in the most rigorous sense incompatible 
with being happy? Does it not, on the contrary, require misfortune, self-denial and self-
mistreatment as a necessary means?”28 Our yes to life, our spiritualization, and 
ennobling of the basic instincts; everything higher in life comes at the price of self-
negation, pain, and suffering. 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 120. 
 
27 Ibid., 121. 
 
28 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 211, aphorism 393. 
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Science, scientists, the faith of the Enlightenment, are all historical developments 
that claim to be the antithesis of everything about the ascetic ideal. The will to truth in 
them has vanquished the belief in “God, the beyond, and the virtues of denial.”29 
However, Nietzsche argues, “science,” and the will to truth “are rather the latest and 
noblest form of” the ascetic ideal30 and the will to nothingness: “To sacrifice God to 
nothingness – this paradoxical mystery of the ultimate act of cruelty was reserved for the 
generation which is even now arising: we all know something of it already.”31 He claims 
that the godlessness of the wave of scholars and philosophers who overthrew God, is not 
at all an indication of their triumph over the ascetic ideal, “those last idealists left among 
philosophers and scholars: are they perhaps the desired opponents of the ascetic ideal, 
the counteridealists? Indeed, they believe they are, these ‘unbelievers’ (for that is what 
they are, one and all); they are so serious on this point, so passionate about it in word 
and gesture, that the faith that they are opponents of this ideal seems to be the last 
remnant of faith they have left.”32  Thus, the thinkers of the Enlightenment with their 
adamant rejection of God are a purer form of the will to truth than the religious type, 
because they no longer need God in order to deny life. “The conscientiousness in small 
things, the self-control of the religious man were a preparatory school for the scientific 
                                                 
29 Nietzsche, Genealogy, 146. 
 
30 Ibid., 147. 
 
31 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 81. 
 
32 Nietzsche, Genealogy, 148. 
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character: above all, the disposition that takes problems seriously, regardless of the 
personal consequences.”33
Nietzsche continues, “we ‘men of knowledge’ have gradually come to mistrust 
believers of all kinds… wherever the strength of a faith is very prominently displayed, 
we infer a certain weakness of demonstrability, even the improbability of what is 
believed.”34 Ultimately, Nietzsche rejects the claim of these new “so-called free 
spirits”—that they are the countermovement against the ascetic ideal—for a very 
important reason: “that which constrains these men, however, this unconditional will to 
truth, is faith in the ascetic ideal itself… it is the faith in a metaphysical value, the 
absolute value of truth, sanctioned and guaranteed by this ideal alone.”35 So, for 
Nietzsche, unconditional faith itself, in anything, is a kind of rejection and denial of this 
life. The philosophers of the enlightenment and all those with an absolute faith in truth 
have killed God and crowned truth in his place as the prosecutor of this world and its 
depreciator.  
So, here,  Nietzsche aims his criticism at the will to truth and not at truth itself. In 
several places, Nietzsche attempts to explain what the will to truth is by adding 
adjectives to it like unconditional,36 or by talking about mastery of the knowledge 
                                                 
33 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 262, aphorism 469. 
 
34 Nietzsche, Genealogy, 148. 
 
35 Ibid., 151. 
 
36 Ibid.. 
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drive.37 At other times, Nietzsche calls it the “pathos of truth,” as for example in an 
unpublished essay by that title from the year 1872. Daniel Brezeale explains that “in 
addition to the ordinary sense of the English word, it also means ‘vehemence,’ ‘ardor,’ 
‘solemnity,’ and ‘fervor.’ … thus an investigation of the ‘pathos of truth’ is not an 
investigation of ‘truth itself,’ but is instead concerned with man’s feelings about truth.”38 
In his late Notebooks from the year 1887, Nietzsche even attempts a definition of the 
will to truth: “the will to truth is a making fixed, a making true and lasting, a removing 
from sight of that false character, its reinterpretation into something that is.”39 Thus, 
since the world is essentially becoming and change, this is tantamount to a rejection of 
life. “this longing to get away from all appearance, change, becoming, death, wishing, 
from longing itself—all this means—lets us dare to grasp it—a will to nothingness, an 
aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions of life.”40  
The will to truth for Nietzsche is one of the tools that the will to nothingness uses 
in order to deny and impoverish life. It is the drive to truth at all costs, where the person 
who is under its influence spends all his energies in pursuit of developing this one 
impulse and drive. It is the psychological attitude that truth is the most valuable thing in 
human life and everything should be sacrificed in order to attain it. Thus, all the other 
impulses are suppressed for the sake of this one impulse toward knowledge and truth. 
                                                 
37 Nietzsche, Friedrich. “On the Pathos of Truth.” Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s 
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We shall see in Chapter III that Nietzsche believes this psychological attitude to be 
grounded in a physiological type of human being, who then forces his perspective on all 
the other types. 
It must be stressed here that what is repugnant about the will to truth, as it is 
rejected here, is its unconditionality, and its absolute metaphysical value; that is what 
smells of the ascetic ideal in the will to truth. So, Nietzsche wants to overcome the will 
to truth and not any use or thinking of the world in terms of any concept of truth. He 
does not aim at eliminating all thinking about the concept of truth, nor does he think that 
our pursuit of truth is inimical to life however we go about pursuing it. Instead, his 
objection is to the will to truth as a governing will in the person that harbors it. 
The difficulty of Nietzsche’s task is increased by the fact that “apart from the 
ascetic ideal, man, the human animal, had no meaning so far.”41 With the will to truth 
being the purest form of the ascetic ideal. Thus, the task of overcoming the will to truth 
is a very hard one. Nietzsche sets himself against the whole history of humanity. But he 
does not do that in a simplistic way, for he recognizes that he himself is a product of the 
will to truth, and that in him it “becomes conscious of itself as a problem.”42 Thus, 
Nietzsche opposes the whole history of humanity that is present within him. His 
philosophy is self-concerned. Another instance where Nietzsche considers himself a 
product of the ascetic ideal is in Beyond Good and Evil, where he mentions 
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philosophers, scholars, pedants43 and uses the pronoun “we,” and wonders whether the 
new philosophers will also be of the same type, that is, products of the ascetic ideal. This 
means that he is not setting himself as different from the ascetic ideal, and knows 
himself to be, at least initially, within its range. In the Genealogy, Nietzsche concludes: 
“here I again touch on my problem, on our problem, my unknown friends (for as yet I 
know of no friend): what meaning would our whole being possess if it were not this, that 
in us the will to truth becomes conscious of itself as a problem?”44  
There are two main ways of interpreting this conclusion. First, Nietzsche could 
be the one in whom the will to truth comes to see itself as a problem because he, as an 
outsider, helps it achieve that realization. Or, Nietzsche could be saying that as a product 
of the will to truth himself, he has come to view himself (insofar as he is will to truth) as 
a problem. That Nietzsche speaks of himself in Beyond Good and Evil as another 
product of the ascetic ideal, makes it clear that the second interpretation of the quotation 
is the correct one. Nietzsche is saying: we are the will to truth, and we have stumbled 
upon how problematic we are. But how did this transition actually occur? Why did the 
will to truth revolt against the project of religious ascetic ideal? 
Nietzsche believes that the project of Christianity (bad conscience, ascetic ideal, 
will to truth, faith, God, punishment, guilt, afterlife) as a defense against nihilism has 
lost its power. He does not argue against this worldview on the grounds that it is false. 
His most basic conviction is that beliefs are symptoms of underlying forces. “Judgments, 
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value judgments concerning life, for or against, can in the last resort never be true: they 
possess value only as symptoms, they come into consideration only as symptoms – in 
themselves such judgments are stupidities.”45 However, this project was part of our 
breeding, and we cannot escape its effects in the modern age: most poignantly, that it has 
culminated in a well-entrenched will to truth in us. 
Nietzsche explains his interest in questioning the will to truth in Beyond Good 
and Evil. He says, “what questions this will to truth has already set before us! What 
strange, wicked, questionable questions! It is already a long story – yet does it not seem 
as if it has only just begun? Is it any wonder we should at last grow distrustful, lose our 
patience, turn impatiently away?”46 In other words, this will to truth which is tyrannizing 
the vast majority of human energy must be put to the test of value. We can see that the 
history of the will to truth has settled nothing, it has only bred questions, such that it 
always seems as if it has just begun. Is it not time to raise the question of the value of 
this will to truth? But to raise the question of something’s value is not an affront to its 
value. In other words, that Nietzsche wants to question the value of the will to truth does 
not necessarily mean that he is against the will to truth. Instead, he merely wants it to be 
permitted that truth is questioned. That nothing is taken for granted, that he does not fall 
victim to some kind of dogmatism that sanctifies the will to truth as beyond criticism and 
reflection. 
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But it is easy to see how by the simple fact of the questioning of the will to truth, 
it is no longer will to truth as I have defined it above. In other words, one is under the 
auspices of the will to truth so long as one allows the will to truth itself to be the arbiter 
of all value; allows it to be the judge of everything worthy in life; allows it to force him 
to sacrifice every other impulse for its greed for truth. Whenever another drive or 
impulse is called upon to weigh and give value to the will to truth, its tyranny over the 
individual is broken; since necessarily, within the individual something else has arisen 
that is doing the valuing, and the exclusive right that the will to truth had on the domain 
of valuing is broken. Therefore, any skepticism about the value of truth necessarily 
means that the person is not anymore tyrannized by the will to truth, 
The unconditional importance, the blind self-centeredness, with which every 
morality treats itself wants there not to be many moralities, it wants no 
comparison and no criticism, but rather unconditional belief in itself. It is, thus, 
in its very essence anti-scientific – and for that reason alone the perfect moralist 
would have to be immoral, beyond good and evil. – but is science then still 
possible? What is the search for truth, truthfulness, honesty, if not something 
moral? And without these valuations and the corresponding actions: how would 
science be possible? Is skepticism in morality not a contradiction… as soon as 
the skeptic ceases to consider these finer evaluations of the true to be 
authoritative, he no longer has reason to doubt and to study: unless the will to 
knowledge were to have quite another root than truthfulness.47
 
This other route to truthfulness which Nietzsche alludes to will be my concern in the 
third chapter. 
There are, then, two senses in which Nietzsche does not reject truth. First, 
Nietzsche’s analysis of metaphor and concept is itself an affirmation of the search for the 
truth. But it is an affirmation of a definition of truth that is devoid of delusions about 
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how adequate our ability to get at the real nature of things is. Even the use of metaphor 
aims, for Nietzsche, to get at truth: “Here all things come caressingly to your speech and 
flatter you: because for they want to ride on your back. Here you ride on every metaphor 
to every truth.” 48 These kinds of truths for Nietzsche are truths of life, they are deep 
truths about what is healthy and what kind of way of living is the healthiest, and what 
aspects of life betray a nihilistic and decadent will. 
 However, there is another kind of truth that Nietzsche does not reject: the truths 
of science. This is what Nietzsche refers to when he talks about subduing and controlling 
the knowledge drive. He merely wants the scientist to be a human being before he is a 
scientist, as opposed to being a human being only as a venue for being a scientist, which 
betrays a rejection and resentment of life. 
Nietzsche’s Late Notebooks Discussion of the Concept of Truth 
 In the late notebooks, Nietzsche harshly criticizes the concept of a thing-in-itself. 
He makes very clear statements about how the idea of a thing-in-itself is a 
“nonsensical,”49 “dogmatic,”50 “idle hypothesis”51 “with which one must break 
absolutely.”52 It is conceivable how this might be construed as support for the 
interpretation that Nietzsche rejects the concept of truth completely. However, a closer 
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look at the argument in these writings reveals dissatisfaction with the definition of the 
thing-in-itself. 
Nietzsche criticizes a specific formulation of the thing-in-itself. There is some 
kind of unknown which we “constitute” as interpreters. This act of constitution includes 
the concepts of causality, thinghood, unity, and self-identity. Thus, Nietzsche rejects the 
formulation which claims that the thing-in-itself is a thing and that it is itself—i.e., that it 
is self-identical. He does not reject the idea that there is some unconstituted, 
unformulable unknown which we ourselves constitute and shape into the world we live 
in. He says: “the antithesis of this phenomenal world is not ‘the true world,’ but the 
formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations.”53
As we have seen, from analysis of his criticism and as we will see below from his 
own practice, Nietzsche does not reject truth or metaphysics in general. He rejects a 
certain formulation of metaphysics which is really motivated by the will to truth, which, 
for Nietzsche, is essentially a will to falsify reality. He defines the will to truth as “a 
making firm, a making true and durable, an abolition of the false character of things.”54 
The will to truth is a tool to falsify because it refuses, or is unable, to see the world as it 
is. It makes firm, it orders, it quantifies, it unifies, it introduces cause and effect, and so, 
the will to truth “is a word for the ‘will to power.’”55
Nietzsche criticizes the lack of intellectual integrity on the part of philosophers 
because they do not see that even their will to truth is not based in some real, ideal, 
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better realm and thus superior to the rest of humanity which lives in this world of 
change, but in fact is based, like everything in this life, in the will to power, in the will to 
assimilate, to gain an edge and an advantage: the will to truth is no more than a 
manifestation of the will to power. 
 A distinction, then, is made between ideal metaphysics and descriptive 
metaphysics; and Nietzsche makes a prolonged, sustained effort to link traditional 
metaphysics to morality and moralizing. He says: “logic of my conception: morality as a 
supreme value (master over all the phases of philosophy, even over the skeptics). Result: 
this world is good for nothing, it is not the ‘real world.’”56 This is the reason for the 
rejection of traditional metaphysics, because they were prescriptive, life-depreciating 
metaphysics.  
 Nietzsche then introduces the idea of metaphysics of centers of force, which is an 
attempt to make sense of what is left after we reject the constitution that the interpreter 
does to the unknown. He says that “every center of force adopts a perspective toward the 
entire remainder, i.e., its own particular valuation, mode of action, and mode of 
resistance. The ‘apparent world,’ therefore, is reduced to a specific mode of action on the 
world, emanating from a center. Now there is no other mode of action whatever; and the 
‘world’ is only a world for the totality of these actions. Reality consists precisely in this 
particular action and reaction of every individual part toward the whole.”57 This 
metaphysics aims simply to explain and describe the underlying mechanism which 
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creates this world. It lacks the objectionable aspect of rejecting and denying this life by 
creating ideals over and above it, and for this reason is not a tool of the will to 
nothingness. Of his metaphysics, Nietzsche says: “the world, apart from our condition of 
living in it, the world that we have not reduced to our being, our logic and psychological 
prejudices, does not exist as a world ‘in-itself’; it is essentially a world of relationships; 
under certain conditions it has a differing aspect from every point; its being is essentially 
different from every point; it presses upon every point, every point resists it—and the 
sum of these is in every case quite incongruent.”58  
Nietzsche’s Position on Truth: Interpretations 
According to Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche’s position is a rejection of truth for the 
sake of metaphor. His new standard for evaluation is not the “truth or falsity of a given 
system… not to prove or disprove them… the system must be evaluated not in terms of 
its truth, but in terms of its force and beauty.” Thus the old dichotomy of truth/falsity is 
rejected for the sake of the new perspective of evaluation from the point of view of the 
beautiful and quantity of force. The important question to ask about a philosophy or a 
system is whether “through its means, the philosopher affirmed or denied life. The 
metaphorical style indicates the fullness of life; just as the ‘demonstrative’ style 
indicates its poverty… favoring concepts reveals a will to nothingness, an adherence to 
the ascetic ideal.” We can see then that for Nietzsche the shift of emphasis is from one 
style to another. From the nihilistic style of subjecting life to reason through constantly 
designing concepts and categories for life to fit in, to the open-ended style of the 
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metaphor that embraces vagueness and lack of conceptual clarity as a return to the 
innocence of life, to the preconceptual, where an interplay of a preponderance of 
instincts are at play “as opposed to a single one (i.e., knowledge).”59 It is in this sense 
that plurality, and tension gain importance for Nietzsche. We all live in the tension of 
our instincts (defined broadly to include the drive to knowledge), however, those who 
know how to live in a higher tension and on the edge as in a battle between their 
instincts are the ones that are the stretched bows out of which the arrow of the overman 
will be released.60 So, from this, we can conclude that Kofman’s Nietzsche rejects any 
kind of interest in truth as a decadent way of living.  
This squares well with what Richard Rorty says about Nietzsche on truth: “It was 
Nietzsche who first explicitly suggested that we drop the whole idea of ‘knowing the 
truth.’ His definition of truth as a ‘mobile army of metaphors’ amounted to saying that 
the whole idea of ‘representing reality’ by means of language, and thus the idea of 
finding a single context for all human lives, should be abandoned.”61  Rorty’s position 
here, however, is more radical. He bases his interpretation of Nietzsche’s position on the 
quote from the essay “Truth and Lies in the Extra-Moral Sense,” which may be seen as 
Nietzsche’s most radical utterance on truth.  
These two interpretations and much of “Truth and Lies” point in the direction of 
a Nietzsche who wants to wash his hands of the concept of truth completely, and wants 
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us to have nothing to do with it. However, they lack the sophistication of Nietzsche’s 
mature position in the Genealogy, where Nietzsche explicitly reformulates his issue with 
truth and presents us with the genealogical analysis needed to understand his frustration 
with the concept. It is not that Nietzsche wants us to overcome the whole perspective of 
truth/falsity, but, as I have tried to show in the first section of this paper, he asks us to 
rein in our will to truth and subjugate it to the concerns of life. He wants us to reject 
truth and not seek it if it makes us sickly creatures. 
Schacht, on the other extreme of the spectrum, argues that Nietzsche is 
concerned with truth for the sake of truth. He says, “it is sometimes suggested that his 
(Nietzsche’s) concern with the question of the existence of God actually went no further 
than this – with the consequences of the decline of belief in a transcendent deity; that 
whether or not there really is a God was an issue of little or no importance to him; and 
that this is the sort of metaphysical question of which there can be no meaningful 
discussion, except in terms of the practical consequences of believing one thing or 
another. This construal of Nietzsche, however, is profoundly mistaken.”62 In saying this, 
Schacht is partially right. For Nietzsche, truth is not of no importance at all. Humanity 
itself is a product of this ascetic ideal according to which we developed in a way that we 
are dependent on the perspective of truth in order to understand and comprehend the 
world. Completely ignoring the concept of truth would be tantamount to refusing to let 
the philosophical discussion get off the ground. So, Nietzsche needs truth in order to be 
convincing. But Schacht also rejects the interpretation that Nietzsche thinks that the 
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quest for truth can only be meaningful in terms of “practical consequences of believing 
one thing or another.” This means that Schacht’s Nietzsche is still within the worldview 
of the will to truth, because he seemingly refuses to allow any kind of external concern 
to outweigh truth. Schacht’s position seems to reject the possibility of any kind of will to 
regulate the use of truth, and thus the will that leads truth is nothing but the will to truth 
itself. In his other book, Making Sense of Nietzsche, Schacht also says, “Nietzsche 
renounces neither the conception of any sort of truth deserving of the name, nor its 
pursuit (contrary to the claims of some of his recent interpreters).”63 So, unlike the above 
quote which limits Schacht’s position to the question of God’s existence, Schacht 
believes that, on a more general scale, Nietzsche upholds the ideal of truth, and he thinks 
that it would be a misinterpretation to say that Nietzsche is unconcerned with it for its 
own sake. 
In Making Sense of Nietzsche, Schacht continues to reject the thesis that 
Nietzsche denies the pursuit of truth,64 however without indicating whether he means the 
pursuit of truth as a subdued endeavor, serving other ends, or the pursuit of truth for the 
sake of truth. Since he seems to argue for the latter meaning in his other book Nietzsche, 
I will assume there is no change of heart and that he means that Nietzsche does not reject 
the pursuit of truth for its own sake. He says: “the philosophical endeavor Nietzsche 
champions is likewise concerned above all with the pursuit of a kind of ‘truth’ that is not 
merely a matter of fidelity of thought and expression to the way things are, even though 
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it presupposes their clear and candid apprehension. More importantly, it also relates to 
what may become or be made of human life, and therefore, of life and the world more 
generally, as the merely natural is transfigured and higher forms of existence are 
attained.” With Schacht’s rejection of the possibility that, for Nietzsche, practical 
concerns govern our truth-seeking, it becomes clear that this quotation simply boils 
down to the traditional definition of truth. To clearly and candidly apprehend the truth 
about the way things are, is to uphold a belief that there is a certain way that things are 
which we have to mimic or apprehend or represent. But, then, this is merely the old 
conception of truth; Schacht is just emphasizing Nietzsche’s interest in the traditional 
concept of truth with regards to both past and future. The same concept is used, only 
now it is applied to what possibilities there are and how to achieve them. Therefore, 
Schacht’s attributes to Nietzsche interest in the traditional conception of truth for the 
sake of truth. 
In Genealogy, Nietzsche calls the will to truth the purest form of the ascetic 
ideal, as decadence in its strongest seductive appeal. The scientists of the age are 
precisely the most decadent because they have cleared the ground around the ascetic 
ideal of all objectionable constructs, myths and lies. However, they have not rid 
themselves of faith. “This ideal is precisely their ideal, too; they themselves embody it 
today and perhaps they alone; they themselves are its most spiritualized product, its most 
advanced front-line troops and scouts, its most captious, tender intangible form of 
seduction – if I have guessed any riddles, I wish that this proposition might show it! – 
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They are far from being free spirits: for they still have faith in truth.”65 The problem 
with the scientists is that they are led along by the will to truth which they are not 
allowed to question as scientists. For Nietzsche, a concern for truth is not an objection. 
But it is an objection if the concern for truth is merely for the sake of truth. This is 
precisely what Schacht seems to be denying. He denies that Nietzsche is for the concern 
for truth only when it is motivated by practical concerns. Nietzsche says: “Consider on 
this question both the earliest and most recent philosophers: they are all oblivious of how 
much the will to truth itself first requires justification… because truth was not permitted 
to be a problem at all.”66  
It is obvious then that Nietzsche does not sanction the will to truth as a driving 
force. His criticism of the ascetic ideal forces him to deny the will to truth any leading or 
fundamental role in life. He relegates the fundamental role to values, and value creation. 
Only then can the will to truth be allowed as a subdued tool, as a means, but never as a 
leading will, never as an end in itself.  
In the Will to Power, Nietzsche subsumes science under the banner of the will to 
truth, “truth, that is to say, the scientific method, was grasped and promoted….”67 Thus, 
the will to truth, in its purest form of simply seeking the truth, not only requires 
justification; it is criticized for not creating values, and indeed Nietzsche questions 
whether the will to truth, or science, is at all able to create values. “Science is not nearly 
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self-reliant enough to be that (the opposing ideal to the ascetic ideal); it first requires in 
every respect an ideal of value, a value-creating power, in the service of which it could 
believe in itself – it never creates values.”68 It appears then that Nietzsche is saying that 
truth is not only forbidden a leading role, but it simply cannot play this role. The leading 
role is always for values, for the service of which the will to truth can be employed. 
However, those who think they are getting rid of the ascetic ideal by espousing a will to 
truth are really merely revolving around the same God that the old forms of the ascetic 
ideal worshipped: Faith. 
The main shortcoming of Schacht’s analysis of Nietzsche, in both of his books 
mentioned, is that there is a lack of serious consideration of Nietzsche’s discussion of the 
will to truth in the Genealogy by Nietzsche. Of course, there are many discussions of the 
method of genealogy; in fact, Schacht’s whole interpretation of Nietzsche’s position on 
truth is based on an understanding of this method in Nietzsche; however, Schacht does 
not tell us how exactly Nietzsche applies the method of genealogy to the concept of truth 
in the Genealogy. Thus, Schacht’s analysis of Nietzsche’s view of truth remains 
incomplete, and lacking in consideration of Nietzsche’s strongest and deepest 
discussions of the concept. 
Another reason why Schacht’s extreme view is lacking, is that even if we grant 
him his main thesis that Nietzsche’s interest in truth is a leading will, not governed or 
humbled by life-conditions and life-concerns, there results two problems: first, 
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concerning Schacht’s analysis of Nietzsche’s argument against the existence of God; 
second, we get a very unpalatable inconsistency in Nietzsche’s thinking.  
Schacht interprets Nietzsche’s argument against the existence of God as follows: 
he believes that Nietzsche is still arguing from a truth-worldview and that his repudiation 
of the metaphysical concept of God, for example, is based on the fact of the origins of 
the God-hypothesis is in fiction, superstition, needs (shown by the genealogical analysis) 
which can “hardly be denied… their origins and motivations render them suspect; and 
the unavailability of any cogent arguments telling in favor of them must be conceded to 
tell strongly against them in light of this fact.”69 So, Schacht interprets Nietzsche to be 
saying that the combination of the genealogical origins of the God-hypothesis and the 
lack of other arguments for this hypothesis make the “genuineness of the possibility 
upon which the issue centers is to be discounted. Once a possibility has been recognized 
to be spurious, there ceases to be any point in continuing to discuss the issue it poses;” 
and he finds this argument to be “decisive.”70 However, if this were really Nietzsche’s 
purpose in using the genealogical method against the concept of God, if one of his aim 
was to show that God does not exist (simply for the aim of showing that God does not 
exist), then we might expect him to discuss “arguments telling in favor” of the God-
hypothesis and show that they actually are not cogent. But Nietzsche neither does this, 
nor does it seem in line with Nietzsche’s project to do this. There is something anti-
Nietzschean about dealing with proofs and showing where they go wrong. If this really 
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were Nietzsche’s argument against the existence of God, it is nowhere near “decisive” so 
long as it fails to address the arguments in favor of God’s existence and show how they 
fail to demonstrate it. 
The other problem is that Nietzsche says that sometimes truth must be ignored or 
rejected for the service of life. However, if Schacht is right that, for Nietzsche, truth is 
allowed the role of a leading will, then it seems that it is impossible to reject any truths 
from any other perspective. If truth is the goal, the aim, then we cannot say that we want 
some truths and not others, because there is no will that dominates and humbles this will 
to truth; nothing is admitted over and above truth, as a source of value. Truth and value-
source are united in one. Thus, if we agree with Schacht, then we would have to think of 
Nietzsche’s position as very shockingly confused and inconsistent; so much so, that it 
does not seem to be understandable. In my interpretation of Nietzsche, he realizes that 
we are receptors conditioned by a certain process, and this process creates beings that 
can only be convinced of something if that thing claimed some truth. In the Genealogy 
he says: “Apart from the ascetic ideal, man, the human animal, had no meaning so 
far.”71 So, the ascetic ideal, in its purified form, the faith in truth, is a kind of perspective 
on life that we think through, it is all we know; any other language, then, is going to 
sound awfully odd, especially if it gets rid of truth altogether. In this respect, he says in 
Beyond Good and Evil, “The falseness of a judgment is to us not necessarily an 
objection to a judgment: it is here that our new language perhaps sounds strangest.”72 It 
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will sound strange because it is against our conditioning, it is a new language, a new 
symbolism, we have to develop new ears for new meanings. 
Thus, there is no contradiction in the use of truth just because it is subordinated. 
However, Schacht seems to want it both ways. First he wants truth to be subordinated, 
and second he wants truth to be a leading will. At times, he says that Nietzsche is 
interested in truth for truth’s sake; while at others he says that the leading will for 
Nietzsche, what is of the highest value is “the strengthening and enhancement of life 
which is what he takes in the final analysis to matter most.”73 This creates the 
contradiction in the cases where whatever will is subordinating truth picks beliefs that 
are false. I.e., there cannot be two leading forces at the same time. If we ought to ignore 
some truths that are antagonistic to the mission of the enhancement of life, then truth 
seems to be subordinated to this other concern; and if truth is subordinated to this other 
practical concern. However, Schacht rejects this as profoundly mistaken as in the 
quotation above. 
In his discussion of the idea of the soul in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche says: 
“To be sure, when the new psychologist puts an end to the superstition which has 
hitherto flourished around the soul-idea with almost tropical luxuriance, he has as it were 
thrust himself out into a new wilderness and a new mistrust – it may be that the older 
psychologists had a merrier and more comfortable time of it –: ultimately, however, he 
sees that, by precisely that act, he has also condemned himself to inventing the new – 
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and, who knows? Perhaps to finding it.—”74 So we see again that for Nietzsche the 
interest in truth is subordinate to some other interest, the finding of truth is only 
incidental, it is the subject of the question: “who knows?” which almost amounts to a 
“who cares?” The question of truth is only incidental, the primary action, the leading 
will ought to be one that is creative, and creation is always creation toward an end; and 
this end ought to be bettering the conditions of life. 
Of course, Nietzsche is not opposed to figuring out truths about what sorts of 
things actually enhance and strengthen life and which things do not. This kind of truth-
seeking, however, does not pose a problem to the interpretation provided here. Nietzsche 
is not opposed to the pursuit of truth in general. He is only critical of the will to the truth 
as a final aim, without any qualifiers or limits, or higher governing concerns. In fact, 
Nietzsche in several places praises truth and the pursuit of truth, and explains how 
“‘these coming philosophers’ are to be thought of as ‘new friends of ‘truth,’’”75 and “a 
philosopher must have the liveliest intellectual conscience, and a steadfast determination 
to tolerate nothing that critical scrutiny reveals to be ‘unworthy of belief.’”76 They are 
not new friends of truth in the sense that truth is their master-aim. To the contrary, they 
use their analysis to find out what things enhance and strengthen life (to this end critical 
scrutiny is employed) in order to promote strength and boldness. “And knowledge itself: 
let it be something else for others… -- for me it is a world of dangers and victories in 
which heroic feelings, too, find places to dance and play. ‘Life as a means to knowledge’ 
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– with this principle in one’s heart one can live not only boldly but even gaily, and laugh 
gaily too.” 77 The important thing to discern here, as Schacht points out, is that Nietzsche 
justifies this concept by its effects: it enables him to live boldly and to laugh gaily. Thus, 
again we are returned to the conditions of the enhancement of life.  
*      *      * 
Ultimately Nietzsche is against faith in the truth, he is not antagonistic toward 
having an interest in truth. He wants this faith which he terms will to truth to be 
questioned, delimited, tamed, so that it no longer has the absolute power over all things, 
which it had for the scientist. Something now has the right to govern the will to truth, 
and use it to achieve other goals. Right before he criticizes the “unbelievers,” the “last 
idealists left among philosophers,” as being the purest form of the ascetic ideal, and, 
thus, far from being this ideal’s opponents, he says: “we ‘men of knowledge’ have 
gradually come to mistrust believers of all kinds.”78 Thus, it becomes clear that 
Nietzsche’s objection is against faith – the faith in truth. Those so called free spirits “are 
far from being free spirits: for they still have faith in truth.”79 Nietzsche emphasizes the 
word free in this quote, because faith, for him, is a kind of un-freedom, a kind of 
enslavement. One does not own oneself, there is a taboo that is beyond one’s power, one 
does not have clearance to question, one has faith. Nietzsche sees this as a remnant of a 
defeated worldview that must be overcome. Thus, to free oneself of the enslavement, 
one must rid oneself of faith; one must cease to be a believer in every respect; one must 
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give oneself license to venture any hypothesis, to ask any question. So, it becomes clear 
then that Nietzsche’s target in the Genealogy is faith. He is not attacking the use of truth 
or interest in truth but faith in and will to truth. The big question then is what exactly 
does the elimination of the faith in truth amount to? 
Rejecting faith in truth means that there is another arbiter that is going to submit 
truth to questioning, and for Nietzsche the only thing that is worthy of such a task is the 
will to the enhancement of life. The will to truth is not rejected in itself, but it is made to 
abdicate its role as the highest meaning of the earth. Now, the will to truth is just another 
subject; and the will to strength, courage, and living gaily ascends to the throne. They 
are what justifies any interest in knowledge or truth: “‘Life as a means to knowledge’ – 
with this principle in one’s heart one can live not only boldly but even gaily, and laugh 
gaily too.”80 What redeems the will to knowledge is that it still affords one to live boldly 
and gaily.  
Now, with the will to truth rejected as a leading force and affect, the focus shifts 
to something else, to the preservation of life, to the advancement of life, and to life 
conditions, instead of truth. Even the falsest judgments are admissible in the search for 
that which advances life the most; falseness is no longer necessarily an objection to a 
judgment. Thus the great question is answered. “The falseness of a judgment is to us not 
necessarily an objection to a judgment… the question is to what extent it is life-
advancing, life-preserving… and our fundamental tendency is to assert that the falsest 
judgments (to which synthetic judgments a priori belong) are the most indispensable to 
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us, that without granting as true the fiction of logic, without measuring reality against the 
purely invented world of the unconditional and self-identical, without a continual 
falsification of the world by means of numbers, mankind could not live – that to 
renounce false judgments would be to renounce life, would be to deny life.”81 All this 
culminates in what? Points to what? It points to Nietzsche’s lack of concern for whether 
what promotes life is actually true. A higher goal lurks above mankind: self-
enhancement. 
So, the will to truth is rejected as a kind of faith in truth, while the use of truth is 
not rejected. Nietzsche talks of “these coming philosophers” who are “new friends of 
‘truth.’”82 “We have abolished the real world: what world is left? The apparent world 
perhaps? … but no! with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world!”83 
The real world is abolished and with it the apparent world. What does this mean for 
Nietzsche? We surely cannot remain in the sphere of a will to truth and make such a 
statement, for it is incoherent from that perspective. It can only mean an overcoming of 
the will to truth, of all metaphysics based on the will to truth, based on determining what 
the thing in itself is, based on absolutes. Otherwise, one would be right in wondering 
with Derrida about whether Nietzsche was saying anything meaningful at all… This end 
of metaphysics, what does it amount to? “Its secret is rather the possibility that indeed it 
might have no secret, that it might only be pretending to be simulating some hidden truth 
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within its folds.”84 The abolishment of both real and apparent worlds is a redefinition of 
the kind of will that gains ascendancy, or that should gain ascendancy when we 
philosophize. 
Nietzsche sees himself as the ascetic ideal turning against itself, he sees himself 
as the culmination of this long process in history, as a product of all those he criticizes as 
having fallen victim to this ideal, it is for this reason that the beginning must be called 
forth to contribute to the ending of this page of history; for this reason Zarathustra 
himself must be brought to do the deed. For from Zarathustra, the beginning, until 
Nietzsche, the beginning of the end, there is some kind of unity, and there is much of 
what Zarathustra started, i.e., of Zarathustra, in Nietzsche. Thus, after so many hundreds 
of years of pregnant illness the ascetic ideal finally realizes the need to overcome 
itself.85 It recognizes itself as a problem. With the rejection of the will to truth as a purer 
form of the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche’s philosophy is faced with the task of rejecting and 
overcoming the whole history of humanity. The question thus becomes: What does 
Nietzsche wish to substitute for this history? What does he hope for humanity’s future? 
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CHAPTER III  
THE PROBLEM OF HEALTH AND TRUTH’S PLACE 
 
What we have seen so far is that Nietzsche criticizes the will to truth. He does not 
reject the concept of truth any more than he rejects concepts in general; nor does he seek 
truth for the sake of truth. Instead, he suggests that we should go beyond this whole 
framework within which the will to truth develops. He suggests that we should let 
another will--that of the enhancement of life--be dominant. How do we escape the will to 
truth? What is this vague direction that Nietzsche wants us to move toward? What does 
health, the enhancement of life, amount to? 
In this chapter, I will explain Nietzsche’s view of the world consisting of two 
types of forces—the active and the reactive. He puts forth the argument that history has 
been the history of nihilism understood as an expression of the will to nothingness that 
has taken over western humanity by several means, including taboo (enforced by 
external use of force), conscience, and otherworldly authority figures. He sees his task as 
that of countering the tools through which the reactive forces actualize their triumph 
over the active forces. However, he cannot present us with a clear way to fight nihilism 
itself. Nietzsche did not view himself as the destroyer of nihilism and its foremost tool: 
resentment. But he points toward a form of life free of resentment, and suggests several 
general ways of possibly clearing the way for such a form of life to become possible. 
The body and the emphasis on physiology are supposed to ground us within our 
bodies and self-interest. This self-interest is the most important countermeasure and 
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protection humans can use against the force of nihilism and its depreciation of life. Life 
is the body, through which we discover a richness of instincts and drives, which is the 
second clue Nietzsche gives: we ought not to allow the tyranny of one drive over all 
others and to distance ourselves from the tyranny of the will to truth which 
contemporary culture encourages. The key to counter reaction is being diverse and in 
control of one’s instincts, even as one develops them to their full potential. Finally, this 
development of the different and differing instincts and drives will necessarily cause 
contradictions as they strive for different things. The energy for defeating nihilism itself 
is hoped to be reached by the advent of sovereign individuals who diversify themselves 
and become more complete human beings—that is, more complete animals—in that they 
are in touch with a considerable amount of energy that their conflicting drives have to 
offer. But this is not Nietzsche’s task but that of those who come because of him. 
Nihilism 
Nietzsche believes that throughout history, a will has been gaining strength and 
getting purer and stronger as time progresses: the will to nothingness. The force of 
nihilism is the purest manifestation of that will. Nihilism is the process of becoming 
reactive of active forces. In individual human beings, it occurs when the active forces are 
overwhelmed by the reactive forces.86 At this juncture, the self turns on itself and instead 
of venting its feelings and accomplishing its desires on the outside world, it releases its 
cruelty in self-mutilation (a more detailed account of this is given in Chapter II). In 
nations, nihilism is the force of disintegration that gains the upper hand when nations 
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and cultures grow weak and the richness of a people is narrowed down and slowly 
eliminated until only the conditions under which one type of man in the society can 
survive. This process of eliminating boundaries and distance between the types of human 
beings “means that they should resemble each other in their needs and demands—more 
clearly: that they should perish.”87 This “demand for ‘humanization’ (which quite 
naively believes itself to posses the formula for ‘what is human?’) is a tartuffery, behind 
which a quite definite type of man seeks to attain domination: more exactly, a quite 
definite instinct, the herd instinct: the tendency to make men more and more alike.” The 
herd instinct which wishes to make everyone and everything equal is the paradigm case 
of nihilism. It aims at making everyone and everything the same, equally boring, and 
thus reduces the value of life, because it reduces interest in it. 
From this picture of history, we can see that the popular way of looking at 
Nietzsche as an existentialist who believes in history that basically repeats itself 
meaninglessly generation after generation, is inadequate or at least incomplete. The fact 
that Nietzsche’s foremost concern is about the strengthening of nihilism and its 
overwhelming of everything noble in life, means that he cannot be thought of in terms of 
the Greek cycles, with future generations experiencing, more or less, the same affects, 
conflicts, having the same chances of revolt, the same energies available to be 
actualized. Nietzsche believes that the forces of reaction are growing stronger with time, 
and that history does not proceed in cycles. His most intense fear is that the death of God 
will cause humanity to weary of life, i.e., of itself; and that the possibility of a dawn 
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based on the realization of God’s death, might actually turn into an unhinging of the 
Earth that makes life aimless, meaningless, and stupid. Nietzsche’s ‘madman’ from the 
Gay Science, expresses these fears very poignantly: “‘Whither is God’ he cried. ‘I shall 
tell you. We have killed him—you and I…Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the 
whole horizon? What did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it 
moving now?... Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, 
sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as 
through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space?”88 One of the 
most important metaphors used here is that of the possibility of the earth’s moving away 
from all suns. The sun is the source of life, and without it humanity would perish, and 
Nietzsche wonders whether we will have the strength to steer the earth into new suns or 
whether we would prove to be weaker than our deed of killing god. But why is nihilism 
such a huge threat to everything noble? 
Nietzsche argues that nihilism is an underlying force in history that has used 
Judaism, Christianity, and countless other beliefs systems in order to bring down all the 
strong types and make everyone and everything meek and mediocre. This process is 
inimical to any kind of originality, creativity, or independence, and it feeds on the 
conglomeration of the weak into groups in order to overpower the stronger types of life 
whose instinct is to depend on themselves and on their strength unlike the herd which 
conglomerates and thus depends on others for its well-being. 
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As history progresses, this force is becoming purer and more refined. From the 
Judaic priesthood, to Christ on the cross, the symbol of the guilt and bad conscience 
through which Christianity conquered the Roman (a stronger type of man). Then 
Protestantism and the reformation, and the enlightenment’s will to truth which then 
completely breaks with the idea of God. “Christianity as a dogma was destroyed by its 
own morality.”89 All those are purer and purer forms of this will to nothingness, and 
point to its tremendous power, adaptability, and cleverness. 
Nietzsche believes that this force poses the greatest threat to life in general. The 
possibility of this force’s triumph over every sign of strength and power in life is the 
possibility of turning life into an emasculated, equalized, boring thing, such that it is 
empty of life though it is living (biologically speaking); in other words, it is a life not 
worth living--the life of the subdued, tamed, obedient animal lacking in courage, 
strength, intensity and style. 
Nihilism and Types of Forces 
According to Nietzsche there are different types of forces. “Reactions cannot be 
grasped or scientifically understood as forces if they are not related to superior forces – 
forces of another type.”90 So, there are reactions, and superior forces of another type. 
Forces, for Nietzsche, can either be reactive or active ones. The active forces are the 
ones that affirm themselves, their strength, their pride, their power. Reactive ones, on the 
other hand, define themselves in reaction to the active forces. Thus reactive forces, 
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initially dominated by the active forces, are then grouped together and joined by the 
force of nihilism and devise a clever war of feelings and trick the active forces into 
giving up their domination by developing a conscience and denouncing their actions, 
desires, tendencies, they are taught to “leave their actions in the lurch.”91 This is how 
active forces become reactive, and what Deleuze calls the “becoming-reactive of forces” 
which is triumphant everywhere and whose mechanisms, “ressentiment, bad conscience, 
and nihilism…are the foundation of the humanity in man.”92
So, we are overwhelmed by the reactive, our whole being, our whole life, our 
existence is that of reactive force, of the subdued animal. Nietzsche’s solution to this 
dilemma is that we should, therefore, overcome our humanity, which is in its essence too 
weak to counteract nihilism, so we should overcome it in order to make way for the 
possibility of the becoming active of forces. We should move forward beyond man, into 
the realm of the overman, which is the kind of being that is able to affirm everything and 
leave behind all ressentiment, bad conscience and nihilism. But how do we move toward 
the overman and how do we prepare the way for him? How are we to counteract nihilism 
and stop the marching triumph of reactive forces? 
The Problem of a New Direction, Nietzsche’s Task 
The new direction becomes a problem when we realize that Nietzsche does not 
quite know how to achieve what he wants it to amount to. Perhaps it is in the nature of 
the problem to be unknowable before it is achieved, but Nietzsche does not know how to 
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achieve this becoming-active. His philosophy is a philosophy of destroying limits placed 
on human existence by the reactive forces. He sees his task as the unveiling of different 
concepts that nihilism employs in order to separate the active forces from their force. 
Thus, since the becoming reactive of active forces is based on nihilism’s employing 
certain concepts as tools to control the strong; by counteracting those tools, Nietzsche 
thinks he can make way for the possibility of the development of some stronger type of 
man that is actually capable of fighting nihilism itself—as opposed to simply its tools, or 
symptoms. “Philosophy, as I have so far understood and lived it, means living 
voluntarily among ice and high mountains—seeking out everything strange and 
questionable in existence, everything so far placed under a ban by morality.”93 For 
example, he attacks the concepts of free will, conscience, responsibility, not because 
they are false, but because the price of moral improvement, of which these concepts are 
tools,  is the “unhinging of reason, reduction of all motives to fear and hope (punishment 
and reward)… the implanting of a ‘conscience’ which sets a false knowing in place of 
testing and experiment: as if what should be done and what (is) left undone had already 
been determined—a kind of castration of the seeking and forward-striving spirit; in 
summa: the worst mutilation of man that can be imagined presented as the ‘good 
man.’”94 The false knowledge is false here, not because it is not true, but because it 
claims to be true, when it is not; that is to say, it is a false hope. Worse yet, it is a false 
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hope that prevents human beings from experimenting and stands as a barrier between 
humans and what they can do. 
Nietzsche places the will to truth under the rubric of this very process of nihilism 
which he is adamant should be overcome. However, he does not know where this 
overcoming of reaction will lead us, he does not know how to get there either. Kaufmann 
says that Nietzsche leaves this task for the value-legislating philosophers who, according 
to Nietzsche, had not yet existed before him nor at the time he was writing. From this, 
Kaufmann concludes that Nietzsche did not consider himself one of those future value-
legislating philosopher, and that he saw his task somewhere else.95 The only thing left 
for him to suggest is for us to experiment, and find our own ways of reaching the 
overman. In this search lies the significance of our lives: “what is great in man is that he 
is a bridge and not an end: what can be loved in man is that he is an overture and a going 
under.”96
However, there are many reactive forces that stand in the way between man and 
experimentation. These forces set up rules and laws, and create consciences within man 
that internalize those rules and laws against experimentation, against the new and the 
creative. Zarathustra has come as the great liberator, as the destroyer of the laws and 
tools of the reactive: “behold the good and the just! Whom do they hate most? The man 
who breaks their tables of values, the breaker, the lawbreaker; yet he is the creator.”97 
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So, Nietzsche does not think that his role is to tell us where or what the overman is; 
where the pains and sufferings, where the denials and affirmations, affirmations of 
denial, in short, where all this experimentation will get us. Instead, he analyzes the 
human from the perspective of the future, of a future race that is not subdued externally, 
that does not run away from itself, and its realities, and the end of its reality: death.98
Regardless of the emphasis that modernity and humanism place on the 
individual, they are mere avatars; veils that the reactive forces of negation hide behind. 
The will to truth figures in this project as just another veil behind which this process 
hides. This will’s seductiveness will claim many who agree that the old world-order 
must be overthrown. But they have not delved deep into the old world-order and have 
not realized that the will to truth does not present a new world order but merely changes 
the king, the head, the ruler. They do not understand that the analysis must be much 
deeper. The force of history is much deeper than rulers and kings, who have little force 
and power compared to the whole framework of reaction that engulfs mankind. 
Some examples of those who have failed are Kant, who posits a vague 
conception of a universal Reason in the place of God; and Hegel, who strengthens and 
grounds this universal Reason and empowers it with the motor of historical analysis; he 
grounds it in reality and makes it concrete. The transformation Nietzsche calls for is 
much more radical and deep. “It is self-deception on the part of philosophers and 
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moralists if they believe that they are extricating themselves from decadence when they 
merely wage war against it. Extrication lies beyond their strength: what they choose as a 
means, as salvation, is itself but another expression of decadence; they change its 
expression, but they do not get rid of decadence itself.”99  
When revaluations aim at overcoming a whole history, a species of being, a most 
entrenched form of life, when it is self-destructive, self-denying, and self-transforming, 
when it aims at fighting against a maze of deceptive, veiled forces that are the cleverest, 
deepest and profoundest forces to ever exist; when one takes on such burdens, the result 
will often be without success. The burden and the weight of this task will destroy most 
of those who will dare venture on such a journey. It is the willingness to undertake such 
a task, knowing full-well what the bets are, that makes it a tragic endeavor. 
It is often claimed that Nietzsche’s relevance is diminished by the esoteric nature 
of his writings, the vagueness and the unwillingness to clearly chart out a future for this 
direction he wants humanity to move toward. This is a misunderstanding. Nietzsche’s 
destructiveness is part of a greater positive project. It is not that Nietzsche was unwilling 
to chart out the way for the future philosophers, or the way to the future life forms he 
prophesies. On the contrary, he believes that this venturing into uncharted seas, this self-
realization as a project without limits, without charting, without clearly demarcated 
maps, or bright outposts of light is what is needed. That is what will help us find and 
experiment in different ways to overcome reaction. Anything and anyone can easily be 
compromised and infected or seduced by the forces of reaction, or simply run out of 
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energy and degenerate. The false lures of the reactive life are great. Perhaps greater than 
any human can resist or see through. But they remain false lures. “Verily a polluted 
stream is man. One must be a sea to be able to receive a polluted stream without 
becoming unclean. Behold, I teach you the overman: he is this sea; in him your great 
contempt can go under.”100
Nietzsche gives us outlines of a way of life that will come if humanity has the 
strength to move toward it, if humanity possesses the power to overcome itself. It is a 
journey to no one specifically designated place, to new seas, more importantly, to 
unknown seas. The philosophers of the future are expected to have the constitution for 
such hardship, for such hard suffering, and such uncertainty. Furthermore, there are no 
guarantees. The possible roads and paths to history’s and humanity’s self-overcoming 
are infinite, with many that will probably lead nowhere, lead back to reaction, or to 
undesirable futures, and many will waste their lives in this fashion,  “I love him who 
wants to create over and beyond himself and thus perishes.”101
The Necessity of Cheerfulness 
Affirming life comes in at this juncture. Living for the journey, and having the 
power to live an experimental life: that is the distinction of those who wish to pursue this 
task. Affirming life in all its aspects amounts to the strength of those world-creators. 
Having no regrets, no bad conscience, no judgments against life, against one’s life, 
against one’s past. That is only possible for those most serious of philosophers. Their 
                                                 
100 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathusrta, 125. 
 
101 Ibid., 177. 
 51
path is crooked to say the least. They have no use for straight paths, for straight paths are 
the mark of a clear destination, or a goal, which the new philosophers lack. “One 
remains young only as long as the soul does not stretch itself and desire peace… one has 
renounced the great life when one renounces war.”102 “profound aversion to reposing 
once and for all in any one total view of the world. Fascination of the opposing point of 
view: refusal to be deprived of the stimulus of the enigmatic.”103 However, their only 
straight path is their overall affirmation, their lack of judgment against life. Affirmation 
vaguely amounts to a perspective of cheerfulness on life. It is a necessity because as 
embodied beings, our feelings are what governs our perspective on life. Nietzsche is not 
saying that there is this task that human beings should aim for and it is very exhausting 
so rest a little from time to time and be cheerful. On the contrary, cheerfulness is the key 
to overcoming resentment. It is not an oasis to which one retreats after long periods of 
“serious work,” but it is our serious work itself. If we do not manage to live cheerfully, 
i.e. affirmatively, then we will be that much far away from achieving the overman. We 
must be able to love our fate and be satisfied with it. 
Despite Nietzsche’s belief that affirmation amounts to having no bad conscience, 
he does not mean to reject its usefulness completely. “You run ahead? Are you doing it 
as a shepherd? Or as an exception? A third case would be the fugitive. First question of 
conscience.”104 So, even the new philosophers, the paradigm for whom is the exception, 
have a conscience, but their conscience is pure and innocent. It answers to no God, nor 
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to any absolute reason whether attached or detached from the historical; it is the 
conscience that preserves seriousness in the face of care-free living, purposelessness, 
free-roaming, lost living; which are the stamps of the will to nothingness. “The 
revaluation of all values, this question mark, so black, so tremendous that it casts 
shadows upon the man who puts it down—such a destiny of a task compels one to run 
into the sun every moment to shake off a heavy, all-too-heavy seriousness.”105 Nietzsche 
is not advocating the condemnation of seriousness. However, being engaged in 
something so dangerous and serious as a revaluation of all values, requires a heavy 
seriousness which the new philosophers must find ways to shake off in order to 
rejuvenate their strength to continue in their seriousness. “I understand by ‘freedom of 
spirit’ something quite definite: being a hundred times superior to philosophers and other 
disciples of ‘truth’ in severity towards oneself, in cleanliness and courage, in the 
unconditional will to say No where it is dangerous to say No—I treat previous 
philosophers as contemptible libertines hiding in the cloak of the woman ‘truth.’”106
Why Nietzsche’s Open-ended Solution Is Dangerous 
What makes Nietzsche’s project so hard is that there are avatars of a similar life 
produced by the reactive forces; the life that is care-free, purposelessly purposeless, free-
roaming, and lost.  
Just as there is a lowly and vile prudence of the weak, so is there a noble and 
proud prudence of the strong; a cowardly and weak cruelty as well as courageous 
and strong cruelty; a pessimism that is a symptom of exhaustion and 
decomposition as well as a pessimism that manifests itself a superabundance of 
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energy, that constitutes a kind of luxury of strength. The need for destruction and 
change can be the expression just as much of an exuberant and overflowing 
strength as of a hatred and malcontent in the face of what is. In the same way, the 
need for stabilizing, fixing, and ‘externalizing’ can come as much from 
generosity and happiness as from rancor and a morbid desire to perpetuate 
suffering and unhappiness.107  
 
However, for Nietzsche, the new philosophers are so serious as to be scholars in search 
of their vague and unclear aim and target. Their distinctive character is their seriousness; 
that is what distinguishes them from the aimless nihilists. Furthermore, their 
cheerfulness is what distinguishes them from the serious scholars who are still under the 
tutelage of the will to nothingness and the ascetic ideal. The new path is only fit for those 
who have a great energy and who know how to dispense with and rejuvenate their 
energy cheerfully. Their cheerfulness comes from their taking joy in creation. They are 
the signs of the ascending forms of life, which affirm life (i.e. affirm themselves) and do 
not judge, nor condemn it, nor demand of it what the nihilist demands and what it cannot 
grant. The nihilist is at heart and by nature destructive, and represents the descending 
form of life.  
The new philosophers, on the other hand, are not overburdened by false hopes 
and impossible ends and ideals, and if they do, they know how to shed off these harmful 
skins--they have light feet. The nihilist is the opposite of the creator because he is 
burdened by the weight of judging and demanding, where he should obey and listen to 
life’s demands. He is the traditional philosopher whose frustrations with life have always 
made him come to it with predetermined demands. He wants to affirm only part of life; 
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the orderly, the reasoned, the weighable, the straight line. It is this that always betrays 
the nihilism in him. Their philosophies are reactions against life; against life they affirm 
the eternal, the orderly, the rational. They affirm their hopes and dreams of a safe, 
subdued, danger-less, and predictable life—that is, a life with which they can manage 
not to be frustrated. 
Nietzsche’s Role, Physics, Physiology vs. Reaction 
Given this sketch of an experimental life which for Nietzsche is to be the road to 
the overman, what is the role that Nietzsche plays? I have suggested that Nietzsche saw 
himself as the breaker of the old laws that prohibit too much and condemn too much. But 
how does he do that? 
Here, Nietzsche’s statement that the new philosophers must be scholars is 
important. Nietzsche himself, in living the scholarly life of reading, thinking, 
contemplating, analyzing, and perhaps, especially, engaging in critique is himself a 
scholar. He studies and contemplates the different dams that reactive forces have put 
against the flow of the river of active forces. His method of destroying these dams is by 
presenting an analysis of the reactive forces based on the new perspective of physics, 
physiology and the body. Since “moral values (are) illusory values compared with 
physiological (ones),”108 he aims to start a counter movement against the reactive forces 
and their tools, a countermovement whose tools are grounded in physiology. “The body 
and physiology the starting point: why?—we gain the correct idea of the nature of our 
subject-unity, namely as the regents at the head of a communality (not as ‘souls’ or ‘life 
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forces’), also the dependence of these regents upon the ruled and of an order of rank and 
division of labor as the conditions that make possible the whole and its parts.”109 So, we 
“start from the body and employ it as a guide”110 because it holds the essential key; that 
of understanding our “self” as a hierarchical structure, correctly. 
Arthur Danto says that for Nietzsche “every problem reduced to a problem of 
psychology.”111 It might be added that, for Nietzsche, all questions of psychology boil 
down to ones of physiology and those to questions of force and power. In this reduction, 
Nietzsche can show how the hopes and dreams of the priests are nothing but “poisonous 
vapors;”112 in the hope that this will help the active forces which are separated from their 
force to overcome their internal impediments to action. It is in this that they will be 
hoped to be scholars, they have to be scholars insofar as they have to rid themselves of 
the ascetic ideal, and understand Nietzsche’s, in part scholarly, counter movement. 
 Against the decadent tradition of will to truth, Nietzsche hurls his admiration for 
physics and the physiological. In the Gay Science, Nietzsche says “we must be physicists 
in order to be creators in that sense-whereas hitherto all appreciations and ideals have 
been based on ignorance of physics, or in contradiction thereto.”113 This emphasis on 
physics is the new perspective on life, combined with his fascination with physiology in 
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Twilight of the Idols, I believe, constitutes his method of overturning the effects that the 
reactive forces have had on the active forces. 
 The sages of reactive force, he argues, have a common physiological ground, 
they constitute a type in themselves. It is for this reason that they have shared in their 
judgments against this life. “The consensus of the sages—proves least of all that they 
were right in what they agreed on: it shows rather that they themselves, these wisest 
men, agreed in some physiological respect, and hence adopted the same negative attitude 
to life—had to adopt it.”114
 Their reason for the adoption of an anti-life perspective on life has been that the 
passions are too dangerous, that they will destroy anyone who dares indulge them. That 
the life of the passions and desires devalues life. Nietzsche, on the other hand, argues 
that although “all passions have a phase when they are merely disastrous, when they 
drag down their victim with the weight of stupidity;”115 eliminating the passions 
completely is tantamount to the elimination of life. Thus, this fight against the passions 
is absurd. He likens it to “dentists who ‘pluck out’ teeth so that they will not hurt 
anymore.” Christianity has waged a war of extirpation against the passions, when a more 
“intelligent” war would have been one of beautification and spiritualization.116 Instead 
of this battle of extirpation, Nietzsche proposes “an ‘immoral’ mode of thought, which 
wants to develop both the good and the bad qualities in man to their fullest extent, 
because it feels it has the strength to put both in their right place—in the place where 
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each needs the other.”117 This is what Nietzsche wants to do with the concept of truth. 
He does not wage a blind war against the concept, but seeks to beautify and spiritualize 
it into something that contributes to a healthy human being. He does not want truth as 
tyrant, but as a good servant. Nehamas explains: “Nonmoral asceticism is an affirmative 
phenomenon because it denies some pleasures only in order to acquire others and to 
secure a better life in this world. Moral asceticism radicalizes this denial, negates all 
pleasure, and downgrades the whole world.”118
 The new philosophers then, are a certain type of human being. They do not 
oppose their passions and senses completely. They know how to control their passions 
for their own purposes. If they reject a desire at a given time, it is because they think it 
clashes with a nobler desire they have. They affirm themselves as a certain type of 
physiology which they must learn how to live as. Every type affirming its own 
physiology, this is the maxim that Nietzsche wants us to live by: “a well-turned out 
human being, a ‘happy one,’ must perform certain actions and shrinks instinctively from 
other actions; he carries the order, which he represents physiologically, into his relations 
with other human beings and things.”119 Out of all these self-affirmations of the different 
types of physiologies, a birth of a new species is hoped, the will to the overcoming of 
ressentiment and nihilism is hoped to be found. One type of human being that will 
develop is what Nehamas calls the nonmoral ascetic who “glorifies one specific type of 
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earthly life among others; it does not condemn the pleasures it avoids. It does not 
consider that there is something inherently wrong with them and that they should 
therefore be avoided by all… Nonmoral ascetics need not dogmatically expect that 
others will benefit if they too deny the pleasures they themselves avoid. They have no 
reason for such an expectation since they have no reason to believe that the life of the 
philosopher, which they want to secure for themselves, is good for everybody. Such 
ascetics, therefore, need not be interested in legislating what is and what is not proper for 
others to seek and avoid.”120 Thus, the new philosophers will not be judges of life, they 
will not condemn where they see difference. Surely, they will affirm their difference, but 
not in a reactive way. Their affirmation of difference springs, primarily, from self-
assurance, not from a judgment against the other. 
 By understanding Nietzsche’s physiological perspective, we can see how his 
philosophy is an ethical message for us to accept our limits, to revel in our finitude, to 
live our life within this finitude and within those limits, and be able to affirm what such 
a life would broadly amount to. This is not as easy as it sounds, affirming the whole of 
being means affirming much in the world and ourselves that is ugly and decadent. 
However, Nietzsche’s interpretation, his basic assumption, his starting point is nihilism. 
Therefore, his whole philosophy turns on this point. No one who disagrees with 
Nietzsche about the nature of history as a process of “active forces becoming 
reactive”121 (decadence) will ever fully grasp his main project, his over-arching concern, 
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the “something tremendous,” as he calls it, the “crisis without equal on earth, the most 
profound collision of conscience”:122 nihilism as the advent of the last stage of this 
history, as the endpoint of this process of degeneration. That is first and foremost his 
concern. If we fail to discover, share, experience, even “smell” this truth with Nietzsche, 
then the kind of urgency he speaks to, the kind of intense expectation and excitement, 
the sense of danger, the sense of worry for everything worthy, the sense of personal 
revolt against this process of nihilism, the sense of what is at stake will be for the most 
part lost; and Nietzsche will sound like a crazy man indeed. But if we focus on this 
urgency and see his project of overcoming man from this vantage point, we can 
appreciate the depth of his concerns and maybe find something to learn about ourselves, 
our lives, and how we wish to live. This is all good and well, but how do we achieve it? 
Richness in Contradictions 
In his discussion of Nietzsche’s position on contradictions, Nehamas says: “style, 
which is what Nietzsche requires and admires, involves controlled multiplicity and 
resolved conflict.”123 Right before this quote he says: “an admirable self, as Nietzsche 
insists again and again, consists of a large number of powerful and conflicting 
tendencies that are controlled and harmonized.” The problem with these statements, it 
might be suggested, is that they are very definitive. “Harmony,” and “resolved conflict” 
sound much stronger than what Nietzsche thinks ought to be achieved. The admirable 
man does not resolve conflicts, he strings his bow to the greatest extent possible, i.e., he 
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grows and cultivates contradictions and conflicts within himself for the purpose of 
achieving tension and depth of living and feeling. To resolve internal conflicts and seek 
harmony, for Nietzsche, is just what the person stuck in the perspective of truth would 
want to do.  
Conflicts are not even to be controlled, even that is too strong for what Nietzsche 
prescribes because controlled conflicts and tensions are born out of cowardice; one is not 
daring enough to string one’s bow to its limit, one takes the safe bet of easy 
contradictions that one can resolve and control. But Nietzsche prescribes courage, and 
boldness of spirit, he prescribes to us that we die at the right time, and all this cannot be 
squared with the prudence involved in controlling, harmonizing, and resolving one’s 
inner conflicts. One such contradiction Nietzsche wants us to be able to live with 
concerns truth. 
Nietzsche says that he wants to substitute: “in place of ‘epistemology,’ a 
perspective theory of affects (to which belongs a hierarchy of the affects; the affects 
transfigured; their superior order, their ‘spirituality’).”124 So, truth for Nietzsche is 
something that is affective, it is a felt experience, and the affective is the deepest-rooted 
epistemological resource we possess.125 Primarily for this reason, and because any 
comprehension of a so-called “fact” is not possible without the affective, and because 
affects change and differ, the art of interpretation gains a unique flavor. At the same 
time, for Nietzsche, there is this great tension between two levels of consciousness. The 
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first affirms that “there are no facts (truths), only interpretations,” and the second affirms 
that the afore-mentioned statement is a truth. It is between this necessary tension that the 
new philosophers shall live. The paradoxity of this state of existence is that it wants to 
affirm the relativity of truth and affirm truth’s relativity as an objective truth at the same 
time. Nietzsche says with regards to his perspectivism: “granted this too is only 
interpretation – and you will be eager enough to raise this objection? – well, so much the 
better.”126 It is not in some synthesis of this dilemma, some resolution, that Nietzsche’s 
position on truth lies; but in the dilemma itself. Nietzsche never took his task to be the 
resolving of contradictions, because, to the contrary, he thinks that “the price of 
fruitfulness is to be rich in internal opposition.”127 So, he thinks that contradictions are 
necessary for the harnessing of tension, energy and “richness” necessary for an active 
life. This dilemma reappears in other places in Nietzsche. For example, he asserts a 
certain type of what has been construed as a metaphysics of becoming and of force, and 
at the same time he asserts that this metaphysics is only an interpretation. But what is 
crucial is that he says not only that it is an interpretation, but an interpretation by a 
certain type of force (which all interpretation is). But this second apparent concession is 
no concession at all; the relativist, wishing to make sure Nietzsche was on his side will 
surely ask the question: but this whole viewpoint about forces, is just your perspective? 
And Nietzsche’s answer is going to be: it is the perspective or the interpretation of the 
forces that constitute him. At face value we can just say Nietzsche was a metaphysician 
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of truth in the old sense, because he never clearly and wholly rejected the idea of 
objective truth; but at the same time, we could just as well conclude that for Nietzsche 
everything is interpretation, and therefore his view on truth devolves into some kind of 
relativism. What is important to keep in mind here is that for Nietzsche the truth about 
truth itself is not very important, this is the realm of empty concepts128 where discussion 
is futile. What is important is the preservation of this tension between two opposing 
forces that want to claim ascendancy in us. That too is just interpretation… of forces. 
This argument for contradictions, however, is not to be understood as learning to 
live with the absurd. It is not simply that one affirms contradictions that is admirable, but 
the type of life it indicates behind the contradictory affirmations. Because there will 
always be contradictions and incoherencies in our understanding because of our limited 
intellects, not being threatened by the prospect of contradictions that seem just as 
plausible is a sign of a healthy perspective. It means that the person is less likely to 
develop a grudge against life because of the inescapable inability to decide which of the 
two contradictory ideas is the truth.  
Another reason why contradictions are a good sign, is that they indicate 
underlying contradictory impulses in the self believing them. It is because we have 
passions that we develop ideas, and because we have passions that we stick to some of 
them and not others, i.e., that we believe. Thus, making one’s peace with contradiction 
means one can explore different passions and harness the energy of more perspectives, 
without the need of one passion destroying another. 
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Nehemas best characterizes the nature of the uncertainty and lack of concrete 
ground in which this contradictoriness leaves us. “Yet it is not clear how one can argue 
for a position, as Nietzsche often clearly wants to do, and yet not suggest that this 
position is, to use the only possible term in this context, true. Is Nietzsche, then, trapped 
in an impasse of his own creation?” One of Nietzsche’s philosophical purposes is to 
overcome the dictatorship of the boring and unhealthy passion for truth and only truth. 
Does Nietzsche, thereby, trap himself in an impasse? Yes and no. Nietzsche’s point of 
view is that we should live in this impasse, in this lack of concrete ground, we should 
build our homes on the slopes of Vesuvius.129 We should live experimentally, always 
changing, always evolving, growing, shrinking, and in this becoming lies our being.130 If 
we keep looking at the issue from a truth perspective, what Nietzsche gets into definitely 
looks like an impasse, in the negative sense of the word. But for Nietzsche, what the 
truth perspective demeans and devalues as negative impasse is a positive thing. What 
makes it positive is that it reminds us of the futility and unhealthiness of asking the 
questions of the old truth perspective. To want to overcome the truth perspective and 
then ask whether your new status as beyond the truth perspective is actually true shows 
that the attempt at overcoming the truth perspective has failed, because the question 
itself is part of that perspective. Even the demand for clarity and the formulation of the 
whole worry above that Nehemas presents smells of the residue of the perspective of 
truth. At different times, Nietzsche argues for different positions for different reasons; 
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some because they are true, some because they are interesting, or provocative, or 
dangerous, or because they challenge entrenched beliefs that have grown old, weary, and 
decadent; because they rejuvenate energy and create tension, or because they “spur” us 
to live boldly and actively. To insist on reducing all this multitude of reasons to the 
arbitration of the concept of truth, i.e., to the underlying passion which wants truth in us, 
is to be stuck in the old and unhealthy perspective of the will to truth. Nietzsche’s 
different reasons for believing different things are a testament to how varied and rich his 
passions must have been, and perhaps to how well he met the challenge that he puts forth 
for us. But after a few moments reflection it seems probable that Nietzsche, as a certain 
form of life, or physiology, affirms itself in his philosophy by glorifying the life that is 
rich in contradictions, which is nothing more than the physiology that it is. 
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CHAPTER IV  
CONCLUSION 
 
Ultimately, what I learned in writing this thesis is that the obsessional relation to 
what a philosopher said points, perhaps, to more than a simple interest. To be engaged in 
a project of finding the real Nietzsche or the true Nietzsche for the sake of finding out 
what Nietzsche really said is an exercise in nihilism. It is extremely interesting how 
Nietzsche managed to develop a style that is inherently averse to any kind of truth-based 
interpretation of the kind mentioned above. Nietzsche should be read in order to derive 
lessons from his experience in life. He is to be read in order to leave our shackles behind 
and to risk something in life; we should learn from him to expect of ourselves more than 
to be good worshippers, or good citizens, or moral agents. He wants us to break the 
shackles of sameness and of the equalization of everything, of making everyone the 
product of the same set of instincts and thus producing the same replicas in society. He 
wants us to dare the unknown and to try to be different, he wants us to flirt with disaster 
and with the volcano, with trouble, motion, becoming, overcoming, change, living on the 
edge of the general humankind which is burdened by its fear of the unknown, and which 
heavily moves forward with the weight of will to nothingness bearing on it.  
The logical next step in research, I believe, are the different metaphysical 
principles which Nietzsche puts forth: Will to Power, Overman, Eternal Recurrence. I 
have avoided analysis of these specific metaphysical principles because they would have 
complicated my project and made it much more than I was able to accomplish for a 
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master’s thesis. But how these principles fit into the metaphysical framework I have 
argued for above is a very interesting question to look into.  
 It is a cliché statement that one is amazed by Nietzsche’s ability to penetrate 
through to the depths of his culture even before the world wars, the defeat of so many 
traditions in the 20th century and the current war on terrorism. It is interesting to look 
into what kinds of lessons we can learn from Nietzsche’s psychological analysis about 
what exactly is going on in the world right now: the clash of civilizations as it is called. 
What connections does globalization and the clash of civilizations have with respect to 
our tendency toward nothingness?  
Nietzsche’s philosophy lends itself to many possible uses, and it is a shame that 
with respect to putting him to contemporary use in trying to analyze current worldly 
problems and finding solutions, he is forgotten. My next research step is to try to apply 
some of the concepts of Nietzsche’s philosophy to an analysis of the current 
political/economic/military situation that faces the world. How far are we as a world 
community from producing strong sovereign individuals who would redeem the 
“tremendous surplus of failures: (the) field of ruins?”131
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